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Comments
FEDERAL ESTATE TAXES-
DEVIATION FROM MORTALITY TABLES
UNDER SECTION 2037
A recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit1 has caused some discussion by legal writers2
and undoubtedly some apprehension by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue.3 The case is Hall v. United States4 and the prob-
lem presented was whether the United States Life Table 385 is
the exclusive method of determining the value of a reversionary
interest under section 2037 of the Internal Revenue Code. The
Seventh Circuit, in allowing the use of evidence to show the dece-
dent's actual life expectancy, found that the words "by usual
methods of valuation" in the code7 made it "plain that the statute
does not contemplate that valuation shall be determined in all cases
solely by use of tables of mortality and actuarial principles .... "-
In this article an attempt will be made to evaluate the holding
in the Hall case and the policy reasons for allowing valuation of
reversionary interests by actual life expectancy. This will be done
with an eye toward giving guidelines for future use of evidence
showing decedent's poor health prior to death under section 2037.
These purposes will be accomplished through an examination of
the purpose of the five per cent rule in section 2037, an analysis
of the arguments both for and against the exclusive use of mor-
tality and actuarial tables as a valuation device, and an evaluation
of pertinent cases in light of the purpose of the rule and the argu-
ments relevant to its application. Finally an attempt will be made
to draw these considerations together into some tests which may
be used in evaluating the merits of asserting a decedent's poor health
prior to death under section 2037.
1 Hall v. United States, 353 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1965).
2 Note, 54 CALi. L. REv. 2180 (1966); Abstract, 68 W. VA. L. REV. 430
(1966); Recent Developments, 66 CoLum. L. REv. 797 (1966).
3 This apprehension would be based on the practical problems which
would arise when the commisioner tries to rebut evidence of a dece-
dent's poor health which is introduced to meet the 5% test of § 2037.
4 353 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1965).
SUNITED STATES BuREAu OF TME CENSUS, UNITED STATES LIFE TABLES
AN AcTUARIAL TABLES, 1939-1941, Table 38 [hereinafter cited as United
States Life Tables].
6 INT. R E. CODE OF 1954, § 2037.
7 Id. § 2037(b)(2).
8 Hall v. United States, 353 F.2d 500, 503 (7th Cir. 1965).
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THE PURPOSE OF THE FIVE PER CENT RULE
The Federal Estate Tax Law of 19169 contained a provision
which taxed transfers "intended to take effect in possession or enjoy-
ment after [the transferor's] death."'1 This is the so-called "post-
poned-possession-or-enjoyment" clause. Among the transfers of
property which could be reached under this clause was the gift
of property in which the transferor or his estate had a possibility of
reverter. This phrase appeared as section 811(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939.
Court rulings under section 811(c) 1' were varied. In one case
the United States Supreme Court indicated that taxation under
this clause might be unconstitutional if construed to include other
than those interests passing from the possession, enjoyment, or
control of the donor at his death. 2 In an attempt to make the most
out of the tax law after this case, the commissioner attacked cases in
which the decedent had disposed of property and retained the
income or a reversionary interest in the property. The Supreme
Court disposed of the former as an avenue of collection in May v.
Heiner,13 but found that the latter was a transfer which could
properly be taxed in Klein v. United States. 4 Later in Helvering
v. Hallock15 the Supreme Court disposed with any technical distinc-
tions based on the common-law rules of vesting and made it clear
that it was the possibility of reverter which subjected the transfer
to taxation.
The rule in the Hallock case proved to be a harsh one when
applied to the facts of Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner.16 In this
case a reversionary interest arose in the settlor by operation of
law,17 but the possibility of any property ever passing to the dece-
9 Internal Revenue Act of 1916, § 202(b), Ch. 463, 39 Stat. 777 (1916).
10 See Note, Origin of the phrase, "Intended to take effect in Possession or
enjoyment at or after ... Death" (Section 811(c), Internal Revenue
Code), 56 YALE L.J. 176 (1946), for a discussion of the historical devel-
opment of this phrase prior to its adoption as § 202 in the Internal
Revenue Act of 1916.
11 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(c)
12 Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339, 348-49 (1929).
13 281 U.S. 238 (1930); but note that this case was subsequently over-
ruled by Commissioner v. Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949).
'4 283 U.S. 231 (1931); but see Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.,
296 U.S. 39 (1935), which went the other way on a conveyancing
nicety.
15 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
16 335 U.S. 701 (1949).
17 A father 47 years old had created a trust for his three children who
ranged in age from 22 to 12. There was no expres reversion but
had the father outlived the children and his grandchildren, some of
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dent was very remote. In spite of this, the court ruled that the
trust corpus, valued at more than 1,000,000 dollars, must be included
in the decedent's estate. In construing the "postponed-possession-
or-enjoyment clause," the court said:
[I]nclusion of a trust corpus under that provision is not dependant
upon the total value of the reversionary interest.... The question is
not how much is the value of a reservation, but whether after a
trust transfer, considered by Congress to be a potentially dan-
gerous tax evasion transaction, some present or contingent right
or interest in the property still remains in the settler so that full
and complete title, posession or enjoyment does not absolutely pass
to the beneficiaries until or after the settlor's death.s
Statutory relief followed this case with the enactment of the
so-called Technical Changes Act.19 It provided that no trust created
prior to 1949 in which the decedent had an interest valued at five
per cent or less was to be included in the decedent's estate. Con-
gress adopted a slightly amended form of this provision in the
1954 revision of the Internal Revenue Code.20 The apparent pur-
pose of this provision was to alleviate the undue tax burden which
would be placed on many estates through the application of the
Hallock rule.21 This type of transfer is now covered by section
2037 22 which contains the five per cent test for valuing a rever-
sionary interest to determine whether or not the value of the
property transferred should be included in the transferor's gross
estate for estate tax purpose..2 3 The purpose of the five per cent pro-
vision in section 2037, then, is to relieve the estate from taxation
based on a minimal reversionary interest.
whom were born prior to the settler's death, he would have been
entitled to the corpus by operation of law.
Is 335 U.S. at 707.
19 Ch. 720, § 7, 63 Stat. 894 (1949).
20 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2037.
21 See generally Recent Developments, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 7976, 7996
(1966), for a presentation of the congressional discussion surrounding
the enactment of § 2037.
22 See generally Moore, Transfers Intended to Take Effect in Possession
or Enjoyment at or After Death, 40 TAXES 876 (1962) for a good
explanation of the inclusion and exclusion of certain types of rever-
sionary interests under § 2037.
23 The effect of § 2037 is to include in a decedents gross estate the total
value of all property that the decedent (transferor) has transferred
in trust or otherwise if 1) the property does not vest permanently
in the transferee unles he outlives the transferor and 2) the value
of the reversionary interest retained by the transferor exceeds 5%
of the total value of the property. In other words, if the chances of
the transferor outliving the transferee is 1 in 20 or more immediately
before death and without regard to actual death, then the value of
the transferred property is included in the transferors estate.
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MORTALITY AND ACTURIAL TABLES
AS AN EXCLUSIVE VALUATION TOOL
The primary consideration in determining the propriety of
any type of taxation is the wording of the statute authorizing such
taxation. The relevant provisions governing the taxation of a dece-
dent's estate for an inter vivos transfer in which he has retained
a reversionary interest allows inclusion of the whole value of an
amount transferred by the decedent during his life if this rever-
sion is worth more than five per cent of the value of the property
transferred.24 The method of valuing this reversionary interest is
also provided for in the code,25 but it does not specifically designate
the mortality and actuarial tables26 as the exclusive valuation tool
for these reversionary interests.
The Hall case held that the actuarial tables were not the exclu-
sive tool for valuing a reversion under the code. The court found the
language of the code to be of sufficient scope to prevent the harsh-
ness of a strict application of the actuarial tables, and to allow evi-
dence of the decedent's health to be considered. This holding has
prompted strange responses by some legal writers. For example,
one writer likened it to a legalization of gambling.
Transfers of property subject to a reversionary interest can repre-
sent, in effect, a form of wager in which the transferor plays the
hope of avoiding estate taxes against his desire to control the ulti-
mate disposition of his property at death. The effectiveness of Sec-
tion 2037 as a weapon to discourage these estate tax sweepstakes
will be vastly curtailed by the courts decision in the instant case
[the Hall case].27
Another writer followed a more traditional approach and criticized
the court's construction of the code on the basis of the underlying
purpose of section 2037.
24 The pertinent statutory language is as follows: "The value of the
gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including to the
extent provided for in this part, the value at the time of his death...."
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2031(a). The extent to which the value is
"provided for" is that the gross estate is to include the value of prop-
erty transferred in trust or otherwise if "possession or enjoyment of
the property can ... be obtained only by surviving the decedent, and
the decedent has retained a reversionary interest.., and the value of
such reversionary interest immediately before death exceeds 5 percent
of the value of such property." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2037(a).
25 "The value of a reversionary interest immediately before the death
of the decedent shall be determined (without regard to the fact of the
decedent's death) by usual methods of valuation, including the use of
tables of mortality and actuarial principles, under regulations pre-
scribed by the Secretary or his delegate." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§2037(b).
26 United States Life Tables supra note 5.
27 Recent Developments, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 797, 801 (1966).
COMMENTS
[A] consideration of health frustrates the purpose of the statute.
To the extent that a consideration of health produces a life expec-
tancy figure which approaches the decedents actual life expec-
tancy, a correspondingly fewer number of transfers than those
actually contemplated will be taxed under the statute.2S
Although this does not have the emotional appeal of the former
argument, it meets on common ground with the position taken
there, e.g., there is something basically wrong with a person
attempting to keep his property from passing into the tax coffer.
The merits of this position are best evaluated through an exposi-
tion of the individual's responsibility as a taxpayer. Judge Learned
Hand has had occasion to comment on his point a number of times.
Some of his statements are apropos. "Any one may so arrange his
affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound
to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is
not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes.12 9 In discussing
this same point in a later case, Hand stated that avoiding taxes is
a purpose which "was legally neutral."30 Finally, in relation to the
burden of bringing a case within the statute, Hand felt that "in
assessing a tax, the Treasury is not on the defensive; it has the
affirmative, it must bring the case within the statute which imposes
liability."31 Hand's view would seem to be the better view since
the application of a tax has always been looked upon as onerous
by the citizenry. If the arguments in favor of exclusive use of
actuarial tables in valuing a reversionary interest are based solely
on increasing the amount of money the conunissioner could realize
under section 2037, then they lose much force in light of the true
position of the taxpayer and his duty to pay taxes.
The statute provides that the value of the reversion is to be
determined through "usual methods of valuation. '32 The actual life
expectancy of a decedent would seem to be the most usual method
available for a realistic evaluation of a reversionary interest and,
hence, could not be dispensed with by the commissioner on any
other basis than statutory authority.
A number of other arguments have been advanced in opposi-
tion to the use of actual life expectancies. 33 Probably the soundest
of these is based on the words in section 2037 which direct that usual
28 Note, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 2180, 2187 (1966).
29 Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
30 Chisholm v. Commisioner, 79 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1935).
31 Bennet v. Helvering, 137 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir. 1943).
32 INT. R.v. CODE OF 1954, § 2037(b).
33 See generally Note, 54 CATIF. L. REV. 2180 (1966); and Recent Develop-
ments, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 797 (1966).
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methods of valuation should be under "regulations prescribed by
the Secretary or his delegate." The argument is that Treasury
Regulation sections 20.2031-1 and 20.2031-734 can be read together
to require actuarial computation in a valuation case.3 5 The Hall
court, however, construed these two regulations together and con-
cluded that they did not require exclusive use of mortality tables
in valuing a reversionary interest.8 6 Which construction is prefer-
able should ultimately depend on the wording of the statute.
The plain meaning of the provisions in section 2037(b) is that
the Secretary may prescribe regulations to control the usual meth-
ods of valuation, which could include the use of mortality and
actuarial tables. The fact that the statute mentions "including" the
use of these tables indicates that the Secretary has no power to
make the use of mortality tables the "exclusive" method of valua-
tion. What the statute does, then, is to give the Secretary the
power to prescribe when actual life expectancies are so vagarious
as to require actuarial computation. It appears, then, that the con-
struction of the Treasury Regulations by the Hall court was the
proper one.
The Treasury Regulations do not contain a section purporting
to fulfill the function reserved to them by the code. The only sec-
tion which approaches this is section 20.2031-7(e) which only shows
how actuarial computations are to be made once it is determined
that they are the proper method. It is submitted that even if the
Treasury Regulations are changed to prescribe the proper applica-
tion of actuarial computations, that they would still be subject to
review by the courts. Barring any statutory change, the court
would be free to determine whether or not the Secretary has ex-
tended actuarial computation into a case where another method
of valuation would provide a more realistic valuation.
One other argument which merits attention is the assertion
that administrative ease would require the exclusive use of actuar-
ial tables. The merits of this argument are apparent on its face.
Whether or not the commissioner could assess taxes easier would
be a proper consideration for legislative change but it should not
be allowed as a method of reading out a provision in the Internal
Revenue Code.
The Hall case was decided in conformity with the provisions
in the Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury Regulations as here
34 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031 (1958).
35 Note, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 2180, 2183 (1966).
86 353 F.2d at 503-04.
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interpreted. Unless a change is made in the wording of the code,
it seems that even a change in the regulations could not require
the exclusive use of mortality tables in valuing reversionary inter-
ests under section 2037. Except for cases requiring actuarial valua-
tions for lack of other evidence, the use of actual life expectancies
seems to be the proper valuation tool for reversionary interests.
There are a number of situations in which evidence of actual
life expectancies or special circumstances have been recognized by
the commissioner for tax purposes.37 The use of actual life expect-
ancies was approved for valuation of a transferee's life or remainder
interests for the purposes of allowable credit for tax on prior trans-
fers under section 2013 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.38
Evidence of a life tenant's actual life expectancy and special cir-
cumstances affecting possibility of issue has been allowed as a sub-
stitution for mortality tables in valuing charitable remainders3 9
The commissioner, however, is not willing to agree with this
approach to section 2037 valuation problems. Here the Treasury
Department takes the position that in section 2037 "Congress has
provided a rule of administrative convenience which requires the
application of actuarial tables notwithstanding the facts of the
decedent's death or the facts surrounding his death."40 The refusal
of the Treasury Department to accept the rule of the Hall case,
however, should not be the final word in these situations. Since
this is contrary to a proper reading of the code and since courts
are willing to listen to evidence of actual life expectancies, 41 an
attempt must be made to determine when the use of actual life
expectancies is practical.
37 See generally C.L.B. LowiNDs & R. KnammR, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAxES § 18.41 (2d ed. 1962); which describes a number of exceptions
to valuation by actuarial tables.
38 See Rev. Rul. 66-307, 1966-2 Cum. BuLL. 429; but note that this ruling
makes it clear that the service does not approve of this method of
valuation being applied to section 2037(b).
39 See Hamilton National Bank v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D.
Tenn. 1965), aff'd, 66-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 12,430 (6th Cir. 1966). This
case is interesting because a 54 year old bachelor's possibility of
having isue was based on his personal habits and offensiveness to
women in addition to his bad physical condition when valuing the
charitable remainder.
40 Rev. Rul. 66-307, 1966-2 Cum. BuLL. 429, 430.
41 See generally El Paso National Bank v. United States, 65-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. 1 12,360 (W.D. Texas 1965); and Chaucey Stillman, 1965 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 65,094, for some recent decisions involving actuarial valua-
tion.
98 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 47, NO. 1 (1968)
VALUATION THROUGH THE USE OF
ACTUAL LIFE EXPECTANCIES
The first and most apparent situation in which the use of actual
life expectancy should be used as a valuation devise is when the
reversionary interest is incapable of valuation through the use of
actuarial tables.42 This situation does not present much of a prob-
lem because even those writers criticizing the Hall case agree that
actual life expectancy should be used here;43 and it is not unrea-
sonable to expect that the commissioner would also allow it should
the proper case arise.
The more difficult situation arises in the normal case. Undoubt-
edly the commissioner is going to object to the admission of any
evidence of actual life expectancy for valuation of a reversionary
interest under section 2037.4 4 The next step, then, is to determine
which of these situations are proper ones for court review.
At the outset, of course, the value of property sought to be
included in the estate is an important consideration. The practical
financial considerations are better left to individual attorney-client
considerations, however, so the discussion here is limited to the
merits of the position independent of any financial considerations.
Determination of whether a holder of a reversionary interest
prior to death should have his actual life expectancy asserted should
first depend on the nature of the physical infirmities of the dece-
dent. If a physician could have determined with a good deal of
accuracy how long an individual could be expected to live, without
regard to the fact of death, then this would be more persuasive to
a court. The need for preciseness of this determination on a mini-
mum-maximum basis would, of course, bear a direct relationship
to the life expectancy of an individual on actuarial tables. As the
actuarial figure increased, the span between the minimum-maxi-
mum forecast of expected life would increase.
One argument which may be encountered at this point is that
the statutory prohibition against considering the fact of death may
preclude any consideration of the illnesses which caused the actual
death. 45 Policy buttressing this position is that it would discrimi-
nate against persons who were presumably in good health prior
42 See C.L.B. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES
§ 7.7 (2d ed. 1962).
43 Note, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 2180, 2182-83 (1966); Recent Developments, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 797, 798 (1966).
44 See text accompanying note 38 supra.
45 Recent Developments, 66 CoLUm. L. REV. 797, 801 (1966).
COMMENTS
to death as compared to a person who died after a lengthy illness.46
The answer to this is that it would be manifestly unfair to the person
who had a mortal affliction, not to allow this as a consideration
when the statute can be construed to include such a consideration.
As was noted before, the commissioner has the burden of bringing
property within the statute.
With these arguments in mind, it would seem that the more
persuasive case would exist when the decedent had died suddenly
of some cause other than the factors which a physician would use
in computing the actual life expectancy. However, just because a
person dies of what would, immediately before his death, have
been a prime consideration in figuring his actual life expectancy,
it would not seem to take the case out of the statute. There is no
reason why the reversionary interest cannot decrease in value as
death approaches under the wording of the statute. If it were
otherwise, the statute would have provided for valuation of the
reversionary interest at the time of the transfer and not immediately
before death.47
A final consideration may be the type of reversionary interest
retained by the transferor. A more persuasive case could be pre-
sented where the reversionary interest arose as a matter of law
rather than being expressly provided for. Since this type of rever-
sionary interest is imposed on the transferor for estate tax purposes
under section 2037 (when the transfer is made after October 8, 1949),
the increased oppressiveness of not allowing the use of actual life
expectancies could be asserted. This does not mean, however, that
a situation in which the reversionary interest is expressly reserved
by the transferor must be valued by actuarial tables. If the intent
to avoid taxes is "legally neutral,"48 there would seem to be no
reason why this should be considered by the court under section
2037 so this type of reversionary interest should not be valued by
the use of actual life expectancies.
CONCLUSION
It appears that section 2037 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 does not require actuarial tables as an exclusive valuation tool
under the five per cent provision. Although the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue may oppose any other valuation method, there
are a number of situations in which assertion of actual life expect-
46 Note, 54 CAIF. L. REV. 2180, 2186-87 (1966).
47 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2037(a) (2).
48 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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ancies would undoubtedly fall on sympathetic ears if the commis-
sioner's position were opposed.
The five per cent provision certainly should not be construed
as an objective standard requiring exclusive use of actuarial tables.
It is submitted that in a proper case, the use of a subjective standard
considering the actual life expectancies under the five per cent
-provision is the preferable approach to the application of section
2037.
Steven D. Brumley, '68
